Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 The Antitrust Marathon: Antitrust and the
Rule of Law

Article 6

2009

Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?
Maurice E. Stucke
Assoc. Prof. University of Tennessee College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Consumer Protection Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Maurice E. Stucke Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 22 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 28 (2009).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol22/iss1/6

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

DISCUSSION
DOES THE RULE OF REASON VIOLATE THE RULE OF

LAW?
By Maurice Stucke
DR. MARSDEN: When you saw the program for today,
you may have asked why we chose the rule of law as -a topic for
there
Obviously
discussion.
marathon
antitrust
an
were intimations from history relating to Boston and the UK and
US; but mainly we were thinking about the appropriate use or
abuse of power held by authorities. In antitrust, some of this
comes up relating to the ambit of discretion and the reliance on
increased use of expert economic analysis. There is a growing call
in Europe at least for more rule of reason, structured or not, with
respect to certain practices. And we felt why not learn from a lot
of the American scholarship in particular that has gone on in
comparing rule of law and rule of reason, the use of discretion,
checks and balances, and the like.
Certainty, predictability and administrability are things
even
because
in
Europe
with
we're struggling
that
though competition law itself is extremely advanced in the EU,
some of the issues that Maurice Stucke has raised are quite new
to European eyes because we do have quite a different system
there. The European system is far more administrative and
judicial checks are far less. I thought it would be nice to start the
session today by looking at the ramifications of the current
movement to increase the scope of the rule of reason in the EU,
considering that the Commission has so much power and
discretion. In response to the calls for more rule of reason
analysis, we're hearing criticism from what is usually referred to
as the Ordoliberal camp: they primarily argue that increasing the
use of rule of reason analysis will make it more difficult to
administer clear and effective standards that would be
predictable for businesses and enforcers. And Maurice has
examined many of these issues and helped us learn a lot from the
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U.S. experience.
PROFESSOR STUCKE: Thank you Philip and Spencer
for organizing this Marathon and inviting me today. My issue
paper discusses whether the U.S. Supreme Court's rule of reason
legal standard violates rule of law principles. And to jog your
memory on my issue paper and as a matter of background, the
Supreme
Court created
the
legal
standards
for
evaluating anticompetitive restraints under the Sherman Act.
When first interpreting
the
Sherman
Act, the
Court construed it literally that all direct restraints of trade were
illegal. Then in 1911, the Court construed the Sherman Act to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade and its rule of
reason standard was promptly criticized. Over the years, the
Court shifted toward per se rules, as well as presumptions, as in
the PhiladelphiaNational Bank case.' But since 1977, the Court
has shifted back to its rule of reason standard. And today the
Court states that its rule of reason standard is the prevailing,
usual and accepted standard for evaluating conduct under
the Sherman
Act.
Now the
rule of reason involves a flexible factual inquiry
into the restraint's overall competitive effect, and considers the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons as to why it was imposed. There is an odd twist. The
Court, on the one hand, says that its rule of reason is its usual and
prevailing standard, but then notes in other contexts the
shortcomings of antitrust ligation today. The Court complains
about antitrust's interminable litigation. It complains about
antitrust's inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase as
hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision. It complains that
its per se illegal standard might increase litigation costs by
promoting frivolous suits. It fears the unusually high risk of
inconsistent results by antitrust courts. But the Court never steps
back to evaluate to what extent it bears any responsibility for this
sad state of affairs and to what extent its legal standards for
evaluating
antitrust offenses
are
responsible
for this
predicament.
Ideally the Court should evaluate how its rule of reason
standard, the "prevailing" antitrust legal standard, fares under
rule of law principles. Now, Tim touched on how the rule of law
is considered a pre-condition for effective antitrust enforcement.

United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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In fact, one could argue, as did the World Bank, 2 that the rule of
law is a pre-condition for an efficient market economy. If the law
generally must comply with rule of law principles, it logically
follows that the nation's competition laws must comply with
these principles as well.
Ideally, an antitrust legal standard, under the rule of law,
should promote several things:
The antitrust legal standard should promote accuracy. It
should minimize false positives and false negatives.
It should be administrable and thus easy to apply.
It should be consistent and thus yield predictable results.
It should be objective and thus leave little if any
subjective input from the decision makers.
It should have broad applicability such that the
standard can reach as wide a scope of conduct as
possible.
Finally, it should be transparent. The standard and its,
objective should be understandable.
The rule of reason has been criticized for being inaccurate,
its poor administrability, its subjectivity, its lack of transparency,
and its yielding inconsistent results. The rule of reason's
infirmities under these rule of law principles have several
implications not only on antitrust enforcement in particular but
on competition policy in general.
In my longer article3 as well as in my issue paper, I
identify several implications. First, the rule of reason's infirmities
increase the disincentives to challenge anticompetitive behavior
under the federal antitrust laws. Second, there is a loss of
protection for consumers and smaller competitors. Third,
the
Court's rules will affect future market behavior and future
market performance. One way to look at legal institutions is not
as an exogenous force but as providing the necessary- scaffolding
for any market economy. The law then plays an important part in
providing structure to a market economy.
Fourth, a suboptimal rule of reason will hinder global
convergence. Why should other countries be eager to adopt the
rule of reason given its infirmities under the rule of law
WORLD
BANK,
WORLD
DEVELOPMENT
REPORT:
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 4 (2002).
3 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
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principles? And fifth, the rule of reason can weaken the per se
rules.
This is not to say that antitrust standards should devolve
into the equivalent of U.S. tax code, and prohibit in detail specific
behavior in specific markets. Instead, the rule of law
must account for the law's development and growth. It would be
overly simplistic to say that a complex regulatory scheme has to
be either a rules-based system or a principles-based system. The
Court could articulate legal presumptions that are consistent with
the Sherman Act's legislative aims while reserving at the
margin its rule of reason for novel cases.
Finally, my paper offers several suggestions to reorient
antitrust's legal standards towards these rule of law principles.
First, the Court should curb its adventures under the rule of
reason based on its perception of the new economic wisdom.
Any legal standard should be consistent with the Sherman Act's
legislative aims.
Second, the rule of reason and the per se standards should
not be abolished but reserved for the exceptional cases. The
Court should strive for simpler, easier-to-apply legal standards
that are consistent with the law's legislative aims. The Court
should create legal presumptions of a restraint's anticompetitive
effects based upon the available empirical evidence.
And third, the federal competition agencies should help
the Court in this regard. They should undertake more empirical
analysis of the restraint's competitive effects. One thing that
I found conspicuously absent from the United States' amicus
brief in Leegin4 was any empirical analysis conducted by the
federal antitrust agencies within the past twenty years as to the
costs and benefits of resale price maintenance.
With more
empirical analysis as to the benefits and harms of RPM, the U.S.
courts could perhaps employ a better legal standard than the fullblown rule of reason-something perhaps along the lines of what
Justice Breyer recommended in Leegin.5 For example, we might
have a presumption of illegality for RPM but allow the antitrust
defendant to overcome that presumption in cases of new entry or
in actual instances of free-riding that prevented retailers from
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007)
(No. 06-480).
' Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2737 (2007) (noting that common-law courts would issue decisions that phased
out the scope and effect of the rule in question over time).
4
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offering the value-added services and where consumers were
harmed as a result. Thank you.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Thank you very much. Our first
discussant will be Mark Patterson. What do you think?
PROFESSOR
PATTERSON:
When
Spencer
contacted me about this, I thought I was going to be speaking for
about 5 minutes. He got very nervous this morning that I was
going to be speaking for that long, and he told me to shorten it. It
turns out that his wisdom is shown by how easy it is to cut my
comments.
Anyway, I think Maurice does a great job of
demonstrating the weaknesses of the rule of reason in this
shorter version and in his longer piece, but the one thing I
think of when I think about the rule of reason, he
doesn't emphasize: we really ask it to do a lot. I think it's
probably the hardest task that we ever ask courts to do, even
when you think of other vague, fact-specific tests like the
reasonableness test in tort law. The scope of that inquiry is so
much narrower and the evidence that one has to look at is so
much less that it seems like the rule of reason has a more difficult
task. So I would say that in some way its weakness is not
entirely inexcusable.
I think we'll probably never be happy no matter what sort
of scheme we adopt. I think that some evidence of this is that as
Maurice points out, there are problems with accuracy in the rule
of reason and problems with efficiency. I think those go
the opposite direction. To the extent you want more accuracy,
you have to get more costly and vice versa. So he is right. Most of
us probably think we're not striking the right balance. So
the costs are probably too high, even if you think the accuracy is
one hundred percent. Under the current rule of reason, plaintiffs
almost always lose, but some people, who don't favor strong
enforcement, might believe that plaintiffs almost always losing
actually is exactly right.
Even if you believe that, I think you would think the cost
is still way too high. You might be better off with the plaintiffs
winning occasionally as long as the cost drops dramatically. So
we would need to figure out how to do that, and Maurice offered
some suggestions. But what we really need is some sort of
measures of the elasticity of accuracy with respect to
particular changes. And just as we don't usually have
elasticity numbers for the economic world, we don't really
have them for the litigation world either. So I think in some ways
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Maurice's paper is a call for more work in that area on this
procedural issue.
I actually have some other transient comments on this
with respect to market power, the use of market power and
with respect to presumptive approaches that Maurice suggests
and the approach I always favored, which is the burdenship. But
I will stop there.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Let's open it up for discussion.
There are two issues I would like to put on the table for anyone to
pick up if they wish. A couple of points that Maurice makes
about the fact that with the rise of behavioral economics,
evolutionary economics, new institutional economics, that these
will exacerbate the infirmities of the rule of reason. And I know
that there are competition authorities that are doing a lot of work
on behavioral economics, so that they can ensure this doesn't
happen. I was wondering whether his conclusion would still
follow if the authorities do actually publish their thinking
with respect to behavioral economics and those issues related to
bounded choice.
The other point I was going to make was with respect to
the argument that the full scale of rule of reason or structured
four-step rule of reason should be limited to novel cases where
courts have little experience with a challenged restraint. It's an
argument that I've heard made in Germany. They say well, we
have a great deal of experience with certain restraints, for
example fifty to sixty years of experience of retroactive fidelity
rebates by dominant firms, and therefore we feel comfortable not
taking too much economic evidence of the effect on the
marketplace of these restraints and just ban them instead. So they
say they don't need a full rule of reason analysis for such
practices, or any analysis perhaps; but they would save their
resources for a more full rule of reason analysis of novel issues.
That view of relying on experience over analysis allows
formalistic prohibitions, and is being challenged quite severely by
current thinking within economic and legal circles in the
European Union, even if you trust the experience that courts and
agencies have with a particular restraint.
MR. CALVANI: I very much enjoyed the paper. It was
most interesting. Professor Stucke did a marvelous job pointing
out the difficulties of the rule of reason, but to what end? Yes, the
rule of reason can be quite difficult to apply, but that is hardly
unique. Judges make difficult decisions every day.
A judge in the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg
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recently observed that his most difficult task while sitting on a
high court of a Member State was having to consider the best
interest of the child in a custody case. He observed that child
custody cases employed an often-difficult rule of reason-every
bit as difficult as a rule of reason analysis in a competition case.
This observer is not persuaded that the rule of reason is too
difficult.
Additionally, the discussion of the legislative objectives of
the Sherman Act was curious. Law & Economic Policy in
America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act by William
Letwin and the Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of An
American Tradition by Hans Thorelli are widely regarded as
serious studies of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. This
observer, perhaps erroneously, reads both to suggest that it is
quite difficult to discern the legislative intent.
Lastly, one might ask whether merger analysis under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is not application of the rule of
reason. Is it argued here that contemporary merger analysis ought
to be rethought? Should we return to the days of Philadelphia
National Bank? Thank you very much. Professor Stucke has
authored a very fine paper.
PROFESSOR
CAVANAGH:
When
you
read
Brandeis, Chicago Board of Trade,6 and his statement of the rule,
it's beautiful literature but the reality is if you try to apply it in
the courtroom, it's impossible. And the thing that troubled me
about the rule of reason was there has to be weighing, and judges
don't weigh. I mean they look for trump cards. And somebody
screams out free rider. There it is. Without any proof.
And Terry, I know the courts purport to waste stuff all the
time. This is an area it just seems to me where they're not good
at it. And what has happened is we are a distributor of textile
when this rule of reason almost equals judgment for the
defendant.
MR. AHLBORN: First of all, rule of reason may mean
different things in different jurisdictions. I think if you look at
what the European Commission has done in the area of abuse
of dominance, they've basically shifted, or attempting to shift
from, the rule of reason without affecting the outcome.
And the way you do that is by allocating the standard of
burden of proof in the right way. So you could have rule of reason
Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198
U.S. 236 (1905).
6
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which has different shades of gray, and I think you understand
with the rule of reason when Mark just says almost a sort of per
se legality because it's heavily stacked against the complainant.
You could have a rule of reason that shifts that sort of burden
somewhat differently and you can probably fine-tune the rule
of reasoning that way.
The other thing certainly is asymmetry and that is that
you do have certain screens which filter out unproblematic
behavior so you have almost a per se legality screen. Then where
you end up is only the last step of the small number of cases, so
it's not that sort of clear-cut per se versus rule of reason. It's a
mixture of both in the same case.
is nicely
paper
Maurice's
FIRST:
PROFESSOR
provocative and the presentation continues that. My first reaction
is: who could be against the rule of law? So that's a great turn to
say that the rule of reason is against the rule of law. Ah ha. We
like the rule of law so we don't like the rule of reason. I like
that approach.
Now that led me to wonder exactly what we meant by the
rule of law. And I think this is an issue that will probably go
through the papers all today.
And then I realized that this whole session is talking about
the rule of law and whether there is some concept behind it or
whether it's just that you have to comply with certain kinds of
things. We look at the indicia of the rule of law, but what is
behind it, exactly? And, in part, my question about that is
whether we would be perfectly happy with antitrust if we had
a rule of law that said everything is lawful except for price fixing.
We'll throw in the Darth Vader awful part of antitrust, the
supreme evil: Price fixing will be illegal but everything else will
be lawful. Now that would be, in the terms that rule of law is
being defined, a rule of law. I suspect that for many, but not for
everyone around this table, that would not be what we
would want antitrust to be.
So I think in part-and perhaps this is how discussion is
starting to go-that we're really talking about the institutional
framework of antitrust and how discretion is dealt with, who gets
to apply this rule of law and what cabins their discretion? It's a
very complicated picture, involving judges and various antitrust
enforcers. And I think that's the picture we want to start thinking
about.
Of course, as lawyers we will resort to our favorite
lawyer's trick, which we all know is presumptions that shift the
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burden of proof. So that's where a lot of discussion goes as
well. There is substantive content behind all of this and
procedural content as well. All of antitrust problems are not
encompassed in the substantive rule of law. Actually, the rule
of reason isn't even a rule. It's a standard. That's a little weird
when you think about it. Twombly,7 which Maurice talks about as
a stumbling point, was not about an antitrust rule of law. It was
about whether there was a conspiracy. So that's the factual issue
the Court stumbled on, that it didn't want to allow the parties to
get to. If it were clear there was conspiracy, then it was per se.
So we have a lot of work to do but there really is
something in the rule of law and I hope the discussion will
continue to try to tease out exactly what the problem is.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: I wonder if a lot of the differences
of understanding about what is the rule of law and what is rule of
reason is not so much about whether or not judges can be trusted
to weigh things in the context of the rule of reason but with
respect to their openness and transparency - i.e. how they, and
competition agencies, tell us they reached their conclusion; what
they relied on, etc. So in antitrust we don't need something like
the tax code but we need to be comfortable with the way agencies
use their discretion, and how courts review that process, and
what would help a lot more is if their reasoning at both levels is
clear and we can rely on it. Would that remove quite a few
of your concerns about the rule of reason violating the rule of law,
or not?
PROFESSOR STUCKE: That would help. I mean there
are several problems with the rule of reason. One of them is just,
I remember when I was at the DOJ that there was this fear that
the court was not going to view this as per se legal. In that case,
we would need to prepare the case under the rule of reason which
entails a lot more in terms of manpower, time, and resources.
There is a whole host of problems with the rules of reason not
only in terms of weighing, because under the - four-tier
structured rule of reason done by most of the lower courts,
the courts rarely get to the fourth one.
But the weighing can happen in the first and second and
also as a point that Ed makes, that sometimes the court
just because of the journey that the court sees ahead of it might
then decide to avoid that journey on others such as antitrust
injury or standing.
'

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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So even before you get to the rule of reason, there may be
these sort of procedural traps in order for the court to even avoid
or, for example, failure to accurately define a relevant product.
And I think in that sense, it is foreclosing litigants from quickly
addressing the harms. It doesn't give any sort of guidance to
businesses and they can't readily internalize with the rule of
reason one sort of norms in conducting their affairs.
A couple of points with tort law: the interesting thing is
when I teach business torts, we look at the prima facie tort and
the prima facie tort is the tort at its infancy, and that is
where weighing is seen. Then the court has to look at the
defendant's interests and the plaintiff's interests and weigh the
two and then eventually come to some outcome. Only a handful
of jurisdictions in the United States recognize prima facie tort,
but under the Second Restatement of Torts, courts, as they
become more familiar with the tort, should do less weighing.
Then you might have the elements of the offense and wellrecognized defenses.
And the one thing I find the Supreme Court seems to be
going against is the evolutionary grain. Rather than the rule of
reason now developing into affirmative elements and recognized
defenses, it always repeats the Chicago Board of Trade8 factors.
And the Chicago Board of Trade doesn't really then give
something to the next litigant saying now you can benefit from
the prior rule of reason. Instead the court then starts at ground
zero with that. It doesn't seem to transmit little over time.
The second, with the legislative aims of the Sherman Act,
I agree with you, Terry, but I think when you look at some of the
statements coming out of the Supreme Court today and you look
at the sparse legislative history with respect to Section 2, you
wonder to the extent that monopoly prices are important for premarket economy. Statements like that seem to be far afield of the
legislative aim underlying the Sherman Act. And maybe
that's telling me at the margins you're right, it's hard to define.
When you have statements such as that that seem to be so far
afield and it's based upon the court's new economic wisdom
which isn't even actually mainstream as far as I can understand,
it's problematic.
With respect to merger analysis, I did another paper on
behavioral economics and antitrust which advocates more
exposed mergers, to find out in which industries and under what
Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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conditions the agencies are accurately predicting the matter. One
of the most frustrating things when I was at the Department of
Justice, when we would call up haphazardly, we had another
merger in that industry. You know-you got the last case wrong,
and you thought this would happen but it didn't. And we're not,
we weren't really. At least the weather person knows when
they're wrong because the next day they can see it.
PROFESSOR FIRST: That doesn't stop them.
PROFESSOR STUCKE: We don't regularly go back to
evaluate mergers, particularly in close-call second requests, to see
whether or not we got it right or wrong. And there is this
disconnect to what you see going on with criminal
prosecution; the type of industries that we're seeing and
the industries that are under merger review we think collusion
may be more likely.
With respect to per se legality for the defendant and recent
empirical studies, the FTC did a nice Section 2 workshop where
they looked at private causes of action involving Section 2. They
found that the defendants prevailed over ninety percent of the
time either on motions to dismiss or in summary judgment.
But nonetheless, there is still a danger for the defendant
because if plaintiffs predictably lose, then how is the rule of
reason unpredictable? If the defendants lose in a motion to
dismiss, they're confronted with the discovery costs. And if
they then lose on summary judgment, those that continue could
then face a verdict of treble damages. There was an earlier study
done that found that antitrust had a higher rate of dismissal for
plaintiffs but also a higher rate of settlement, and that might not
be reflected in the statistics as to the amount of dismissals.
And with respect to Harry's point about the rule of law,
one of the reasons that there is such consensus on the rule of law
is that it is so broad a concept that many different things fall
into it, just like consumer welfare. Who is opposed to consumer
welfare? But when you start asking different jurisdictions as the
ICN did, you find out that they have different interpretations of
consumer welfare. I tried to outline in my paper, the
longer paper, what I mean by rule of law and rule of
law principles.
PROFESSOR
PATTERSON:
The
way I
have
been thinking about this is what sort of information would we
need to decide how to fix this. And thinking back to Christian's
comment about the EEC, I always liked the EEC's approach:
Article 82 asks for an objective business justification, and under
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Article 81 you get an exemption structure. The idea is the
defendant has to justify its conduct. So basically you're shifting
the burden to the defendant.
But when I start thinking about the rule of law, it's not
clear to me that you get more accurate. Do we improve the rule of
law? Is it more efficient to do that? I don't know. It shifts the cost
to the defendant but does it actually lower cost -or just shift it?
When you think about accuracy, it probably means the plaintiff
wins more, which I think is more accurate, but some people don't
think that's more accurate.
And so what we really need is more information, it seems
to me, on how you want to allocate the burdens. Antitrust doesn't
pay much attention to putting the burdens where they will
produce the most cost-effective production of information. It
doesn't explicitly talk about that. Some areas of law do that
much more. And so I would be inclined to shift the burden to the
defendant firms on the view that they have an idea of what
they're doing and why they're doing it but not everyone agrees
with that. In the old Limits of Antitrust article, Judge
Easterbrook says, "Well, firms just don't know why they're
doing what they are doing."I I don't believe that, but maybe
it's true. And so it would be nice to have better data on how cost
effectively we can produce accurate information from various
sources.
PROFESSOR ROBERTSON: Since Standard Oil in
1911, I believe that ultimately the rule of reason is all we have.
There are even reasons and rationales behind the per se rule.
I'm a great proponent of the per se rule first of all because
bright-line legal rules are more effective at promoting
fundamental rule of law interests in legal predictability. I think
Sherman Act litigation should always seek to accomplish this
goal. But in any case, and in any of these cases, the ultimate
justification for the per se rule always rests on the
reasonableness of its effects.
For all of the shortcomings of the rule of reason - and I
think that Maurice's paper is very rich for pointing those out the basic problem as I see it isn't only that the contemporary rule
of reason is an intractable morass that almost always
guarantees plaintiffs are going to lose. It is also problematic that
modern applications of the rule of reason rely so heavily on

9 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1
(1984).
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Chicago
School-oriented
notions
of
maximizing
economic efficiency as a primary decisional value. Those
applications are often so narrow that they leave out many of the
other foundational values that were important reasons for
why the Sherman Act was passed in the first place. Those reasons
and values include societal concerns about fair competition,
which were at the root of per se prohibitions against price-fixing
found in Section 1 of the Sherman Act. They also include
egalitarian issues regarding the distribution of wealth, and
ultimately the distribution of economic power by outlawing both
monopolization and attempts to monopolize in Section 2. Narrow
efficiency-oriented balancing forecloses the consideration of many
of the most important societal values that reflect the richness of
the populist heritage of American antitrust law.
That being said, if the rule of reason could be richer
somehow in its application, despite the shortcomings, I wouldn't
have so much of a quarrel with it. If it could co-exist as it has for
a very long time with bright line per se applications, that is,
functionally co-exist, so that the broader purposes of antitrust law
could be better served, then it certainly would be worth
keeping. Now what I'll be taking up to some greater degree later
today is a challenge presented by rule of law concerns about
consistent, coherent judicial determination of fairness and
efficiency considerations in the context of Sherman Act litigation.
The issue presented is whether, because of the way the
rule of reason operates, most Sherman Act cases should be taken
out of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and placed in the lap
of the federal administrative agencies like the FTC which
arguably have superior technical economic expertise and
therefore greater competence to deal with them. I'll argue that
this conclusion about the heightened institutional competence of
rule of reason balancing for microeconomic decision-making by
administrative agencies is equally problematic for the same
reasons Maurice Stucke pointed out in his rule of law critique of
the limitations of the rule of reason.
MR. ALESE: Well, I haven't read Maurice's paper
entirely, but I was surprised he said that U.S. judges were quite
liberal in their application of antitrust law when it was adopted. I
don't think that's right. For example, Peckham was extremely
conservative. In the very first antitrust decision, Transmissouri,
he didn't know what to do with the parties' arguments over the
fairness of price fixing. Rather than borrowing decisions from
common-law which allowed the practice in certain situations and
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taking the liberal approach, he just kept telling them you
haven't provided me with a standard to deal with the case which
more or less links to the notion of fairness in terms of rule of law.
You also talked about Section 2, monopoly perhaps
being the phrase. You talked about monopoly saying judges seem
to think they're okay. I think that's fair to an extent because you
need innovation. You need rivals to come up and challenge
monopolies rather than whining about them or running to the
courts for salvation. And I thoroughly agree with Christian that
we have some cases that are blatantly against the law and some
that are borderline - which is where the problem usually arises.
I think in terms of accuracy of decisions, this is extremely
difficult to achieve because antitrust is a very dynamic field. It is
a field in which judges, like the players, have to constantly refine
things. Accuracy is particularly very difficult to move toward in
common law jurisdictions where decisions can be casedependent. I guess rather than thinking about accuracy, judges
focus on looking at what is in front of them and moving in the
direction that the case takes them. I think they always want to
seek out fairness and efficiency in competition cases wherever
possible.
PROFESSOR WALLER: I was taken by Harry's
comment that of course the rule of reason isn't the rule. It's a
standard. Three of the four papers and possibly Elbert's as well
cited Lord Bingham and his article and the different factors. And
when you look at that, the rule of law isn't a rule, it's a standard
also. With multi-factored tests, sometimes one has to be sacrificed
in order to achieve another. You do the best you can to satisfy the
most, not just to minimize error cost but to maximize
accuracy benefits. So it's very difficult, and the only place where
I disagree with Maurice is that there are two paths in U.S.
antitrust jurisprudence that have not been consistently followed.
If they had, they would do a better job at having a structured
form of the rule of reason that comports with as many of these
rule of law principles as you can in the real world. One is the Taft
Ancillary Restraint Doctrine, which pops in and out of
very
interesting
in
jurisprudence
mainstream antitrust
and peculiar and episodic ways.
And the other is the work of Justice Stevens. on the rule of
reason, which is something I'm in the midst of writing.' ° And I
10 Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62
SMU L. REV. 693 (2009).
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don't think it's a coincidence that Justice Stevens is the only trial
lawyer on the Supreme Court, the only one of the current group
who made a living trying cases. And most, but not all,
were antitrust cases. He was also a scholar and a teacher, but
basically a partner in a commercial litigation firm in Chicago that
did very sophisticated antitrust work. He realized early on the
danger that the rule of reason was a lengthy, expensive way
of saying that defendants win, or if that is what you want, there
are simpler, cheaper ways of saying that defendants win. And he
had the luxury of laying out his views where he wrote for the
court a series of opinions about Section 1 of the Sherman Act over
a roughly ten year period beginning with, I think, Society of
ProfessionalEngineers1" and going through several of the
other cases after that. He laid out what many people call the
quick look, by essentially saying gee, the defendant's conduct
looks suspicious. We have reason to believe that there are
substantial anticompetitive effects. So defendant you better
go first and you better articulate and have some substantial
reasonable business justification for doing this.
He had similar views in other areas of antitrust, but that
was his basic understanding. He used all the tricks that courts use
in the real world, which are presumptions and burdens of proof
because he knew the way in his heart and you rarely get to
it. And the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft used those same tricks of
burdens of proof and shifts and presumptions.
But under both the jurisprudence on Section 2 in
Microsoft and for Stevens, where the defendant really had
something real and plausible both legally and factually, they win.
When they don't, they lose. And that, I think, is a
methodology that would give meaning to the rule of reason. I
think the problem is the Supreme Court screwed it up in
California Dental12 when they said of course you can do it that
way, just we're not sure when you should do it that way. So I
think that's the other path not taken that would have gotten us
closer to a decent real-world solution.
PROFESSOR HYLTON: There is a fundamental premise
in the argument that I have to go against. There has been an old
issue about the common law's use of fact-sensitive discretionary
balancing tests in contrast to bright line rules, and that debate
predates the Sherman Act. Bentham's attack on the common law

12

Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Cal. Dental Ass'n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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included the claim that it was "dog law," because that is how you
teach your dog what to do. You let him do something wrong and
then you beat the dog. That was Bentham's description of what
the common law was like.
People have attacked common law reasoning and the
common law process on that basis for a long time; that it's not
predictable in comparison to rules of law, things like that. In
reality and in practice, I think those arguments have been wrong.
I think the world is lucky Bentham was totally unsuccessful in
getting countries to adopt his approach and codify their law.
So to some extent I see the strain of this argument
underneath what you're saying, which is an ancient argument
that I have to reject, and I think I'm glad the argument has been
unsuccessful for the most part.
The rule of law is a vague concept. It can mean a lot of
different things. So one notion, in the sense in which I find some
meaning in it, and agree with you, is the notion that you don't
want to have legal decision makers unconstrained by the
law. And you don't want to go into court or to agencies and to
have someone up there who decides on the basis of his whim or
on whether he has connections with you, whether you're a
member of the same political party or whether you contributed
money to him, whatever.
The absence of rule of law means a regime in which the
rules matter less than whether you have some connection with the
person who is making the decision. And that to me is a concept
of rule of law that I can buy, and makes sense. And I don't think
that's what you're talking about because I don't think anyone
can say that about the rule of reason as an approach to antitrust
law. I don't think anyone has attacked it on that basis, and I
don't think that's what you're saying.
Another notion of rule of law has to do with predictability
and error costs. But I really think those are different concepts. I
think there is a core notion of rule of law, and maybe that's a
notion you don't want to have in your argument, involving
capricious, arbitrary decision-making. Predictability and error
costs, those are more functional arguments of what you would
like to see out of the law. I personally view those as unhinged to
the rule of law concept. I would not link them to the rule of law
concept because Ithink it's a different concept.
I think when the rule of law gets applied outside of this
more conservative sense that I brought up, then it becomes
something that people can attach to their own interests and start
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to argue, use it as a principle to argue against the things that they
don't like. Whatever those things are. And so I'm reluctant to see
the rule of law concept moved beyond that narrower sense that I
just described.
A few examples on the issue of clarity. I don't think that
the per se test has been a great advance in clarity or predictability
or in the rule of law concept in some applications. Take the whole
area of resale pricing where you have Colgate3 issues. I think the
issues made predictability a mess and put a high premium on
having good lawyers available to avoid liability rather than
making sensible business decisions. Liability depended on
whether you had lawyers there to talk to the dealers. So that's not
a great advance of success of moving to the bright line rule when
the per se standard puts a premium on the legal advice
rather than making sensible decisions, decisions that all sides of
the transaction would think are efficient.
And I guess the other point is the rule of reason has moved
over time. We have moved from just a vague balancing
framework, and crystallized rules have formed under the rule of
reason. Maybe they're not happening as fast as you would like
to see them, but they are happening. If you look under Section 2,
there is a general balancing test, as described in Microsoft
III". Well, under certain subcategories, we get bright line rules.
Under Brooke Group," dealing with predatory pricing, you get
bright line rules developed in that area. So I don't think the rule
of reason is a total failure in trying to move toward bright
line rules.
MR. AHLBORN: Similar direction but from a slightly
different angle. If you look at the criteria you used for two
dimensions, you have accuracy on one dimension, and then
everything else is almost sort of no-conflict between the rest
in terms of simplicity, predictability and transparency. So the two
angles you can go are almost got a tradeoff between the two.
And if you look at the antitrust regimes, which have a
very high degree of predictability, I think you can go down what
Harry proposed to say "look, price fixing and everything else is
fine." Or you can go down like the European Commission which
is the opposite, saying that everything is bad. So that's very
13
14
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predictable as well.
But then you have to make a trade off if you have a small,
very selective sort of enforcement mechanism. You bring the
economy to its knees if you apply that standard across the board
where there is massive or private enforcement. The only way that
works well is where you have an agency that sees three or four
cases. The lack of predictability gives you what I call the
lightning system, where lightning strikes and you get caught and
you have four or five cases and the rest is unpredictable. But you
do not get around the fundamental issue that you have to have a
proper tradeoff between accuracy and all the rest. And I don't
think per se rule is the answer.
MR. BRUNELL: My reaction picks up from some
comments Harry and Keith made, but it's hard to ignore the role
of rhetoric in the substantive debate. Whether you favor the rule
of reason may depend on whether the prevailing law is a rule of
per se illegality and you're trying to argue the rule of reason, as in
Leegin,16 or whether the prevailing law is the rule of reason as
under Section 2 and you're trying to argue it should be per se
legality, as in Linkline.1
So the rule of reason is to some extent a kind of
argumentative device one uses in arguing about what the
substantive rule should be. But I think it is worthwhile to
think about the rule of reason on the merits as Maurice suggests
in how it relates to rule of law issues. On that score, I think I
agree with Keith that the debate about rules versus standards is
one that usually doesn't get you very far.
That's an ancient debate and my take on that
ancient debate is that it's not that Bentham was wrong. It's just
that it's totally indeterminate as to whether a particular rule is
more predictable than a standard or not.
And my main rule of law concern about the discretion of
courts is more of a separation of powers issue. Who gets to decide
what the rules are and what the standards should be? We have
accepted this
notion
that
the
Sherman
Act is
this
standardless delegation of authority to the Supreme Court to
make whatever rule or standard it wants to develop. That is
probably a more fundamental problem with a rule of reason that
unhinges the Court from any democratic constraint.
'6 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877

(2007).
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MR. COWEN: Two points related to that last point: it
raises the fundamental rule of law question about the whole of
the antitrust system in the U.S. I think there is a question that can
be raised in that area when you clearly have a political
appointment system both in the court process and in the
Department of Justice. There is no separation of powers between
policy and enforcement. And so there is a really big rule of law
question about that which I think we should try to pull out.
Secondly, and more constructively, how to fix the system
going forward. What could be done? I think you can build on the
criticisms of the system and ask "Why did this agency not look
back?" I think that's right and should be a feature of the system.
But an agency can also look forward. Authorities can look
around. They can actually gather evidence instead of playing a
litigation game. They may play the game, which I think people
enjoy doing because games are fun, but it may not be very
constructive.
The litigation game misses the point that actually the
ministerial authorities (and maybe there is more opportunity to
do this in Europe than in the. system here) could gather
information in advance if they were gathering information on a
more regular and systematic basis. If such authorities were more
systematic about information-gathering we wouldn't have the
snapshot problem, which arises from gathering information on a
snapshot basis in response to a case.
In 'a perfect world you would have unlimited amounts of
knowledge about unlimited amounts of information and an
unlimited amount of time, and that is impossible in any judicial
system. The judicial system says that we will only look for a
limited period of time, given the limited amount of space that can
be assembled and assimilated. To improve things you can look at
them over time.
What can be done about that? Authorities and companies
can be gathering data on a regular basis. The system can also
emphasize looking forward rather than simply looking back from
the date of a complaint. Authorities could actually database
market information; analyze, assimilate and become more
knowledgeable in the industries they deal with; and make better
decisions about particular situations.
One of the problems that is exacerbated by the legal
system is this idea that things are dealt with on a one-shot basis.
It does not have to be the case, and that's certainly something
that we've argued and had full study about for 10 years. This is
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the issue that the authorities should look at things over time
and should dedicate capability to focusing on different sectors to
develop industry knowledge. If they did so, we would probably
end up with a better, higher quality, more knowledgeable and a
closer-to-justice result. That would be moving things forward.
PROFESSOR WALLER: Bill Kovacic at the Federal
Trade Commission has been a huge proponent of having
the Commission do far more research both in general and case
retrospectives than had been the practice in general in the United
States.
MR. ALESE: I'm sorry to interrupt. My argument again is
that you can do as much market research as you like. This is a
dynamic field, products are dynamic, events are dynamic, and to
move in the direction where we rely entirely on past knowledge I
think would restrict the advancement of the process.
My second point is that Tim raised the issue of political
appointments in terms of rule of law and rule of reason
application in the U.S. I don't think that has a say in terms of
how these things go. The UK does not have a separation of the
executive and the judiciary but that doesn't seem to compromise
the integrity of the judiciary. In the, U.S., judges appointed by
presidents sometimes go in different political directions from
those of their appointers.
MR. McGRATH: I guess what I find in this debate, being
from Europe, is that so far we haven't really focused on what the
conduct is that we're trying to stop. And when I'm advising
clients, I tell them there are some things which are clearly wrong
like hard-core price-fixing. If you put unilateral conduct to one
side for the moment, that's where it gets really tricky. You have a
very wide middle "it depends" category which covers the infinite
variety of commercial conduct, much of which I'm prepared
to accept, even as an ex-agency person, is broadly benign. And if
two reasonably-informed companies want to write an agreement
to do something, then I still think ultimately that once you've
been given the benefit of doubt, even if that means it's rather
hard for one of those parties or a third party to overturn
that agreement in court, then so be it.
I think that's a slight problem I have with Maurice's
paper and I can see it colored by the U.S. context. It sort of
presumes that it's a bad thing to make it hard for claimants to
overturn commercial agreements. A lot of cases in the U.S. seem
to be about this sort of commercial conduct, which can be
arguable either way. It may well be that legitimate commercial
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agreements through different lenses could be about customer
allocation or some form or adaptation of price competition. I rely
on sort of a gut reaction, and I don't think business people
understand. Why are you doing this? Are you doing this to
restrict competition, or are you doing it for some sort of wide
commercial aim? It's easy to put something in those terms, but
you have to start from some sort of presumption, and if there are
certain types of conduct that viewed the policy reasons as bad,
then as long as that is reasonably clear, that can be helpful.
In the European context, I'm not really persuaded that in
economic terms absolute territorial protection is clearly bad. But
the European Commission and European courts, for decades of
case law, have said absolute territory protection banned on all
past knowledge of sales across the border is an infringement.
Therefore it is going to infringe. And if that doesn't have a very
good intellectual or economic opinion, at least we know where we
stand when we advise clients. You can say, well, you should have
a battle on all across-the-border sales. That's a policy decision. So
as long as you have that, I think that's okay as long as constraints
are narrow.
And I think it's often quite useful and informative to see
how things go in countries where things get done badly. I am not
so much talking about the whole side of the rule of law which is
covered by Lord Bingham 6 subrule. I'm parking that to one side
to talk about later because I find most interesting the sort of
writing or framework of judicial review standards of people
acting within the law. But it's simply are they actually applying it
sensibly?
I was just talking to colleagues from our Moscow office
the other day, and they are saying that there are huge issues in
Russia at the moment about how the courts are interpreting the
law on resale pricing. They are basically saying that if a supplier
charging
then
by
price,
resale
recommended
has a
fixing,
which
pricing
price,
it
is
virtually
the recommended resale
is prohibitive and illegal. And that just seems balmy. But that is
the position in Russia.
So I think we should try to sort of take a step back and ask
if we're arguing about angels on pinheads or whether we are
actually saying, you know, there is a lot of variety of emotional
behavior, and if there is a heavy burden on somebody who wants
to overturn that, whether or not they're part of that agreement,
then that is such a fact.
PROFESSOR FIRST: Am I staying in the way of getting
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coffee? I'll just speak at length then. (Laughter)
The last comments were very interesting, reminding us
that what we see in court is just a very small tip of the iceberg.
There is a lot of practice that goes on in lawyers' offices around
the world that we never see. And you really have to think about
whatever rules get articulated and what the shadow of those
rules are in terms of advice. And in part it goes to what I
think the rules should be, not whether we should have a rule
but what are we talking about and how should we inform those
rules.
I do want to pick up on something Rick said and
something I think I heard Keith say as well. A lot of the critique
is about judicial discretion to make up the law. I think that at the
heart of the rule of law debate is the idea that the judges have
just gone a little too far. Scalia said something in Business
8 that the Court applies the common law in antitrust
Electronics"
cases, but not static common law of 1890. I apply the common
law in my head right now.
So there is an evolutionary quality. It does go to the notion
that business practice is very dynamic-go try to find cases from
1890 on standard setting or failure to disclose your patents. Don't
look for them.
For Terry, yes, back to PNB. 19 Thank you very much. I'll
just throw that out. If we're looking for a standard, for a clearer
rule, we might just as well be talking about the actual substantive
rules. We might be better off with a much tighter merger
rule, based on the notion that a lot of mergers fail and the ones
that have succeeded are now failing. So why not prohibit them in
the first place?
I do want to talk about Brandeis for a minute and the
invocation of Chicago Board of Trade. ° Brandeis was the modern
man. He was the Justice who believed not in formal legal rules,
which is what he saw his colleagues following, but he believed in
facts. He believed that you could really learn about
and understand what business practice was going on and that
judges could judge that. Maybe he didn't give us a great standard
for doing that, but he was really against the formalism of his day
and very much in favor of expanding out and looking at the
facts.

18

19
26

Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988).
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 22:1

Now that can lead you in interesting ways. Take the
Boston Store case, involving resale price maintenance on
patented phonograph records. 2 ' The Supreme Court says you
can't do that; it's unlawful under the Sherman Act to impose that
restriction. Brandeis concurs, saying I'm bound by the cases but
I think we should look at this as a matter of economics.2 3 This
isn't something you decide by the formal legal categories.2 4 We
should look and see what the economic consequences are.2
Now we all know what he thought of resale price
maintenance. It was a great idea, because it protected
smaller distributors. So I think in the end, we're driven inevitably
about what the content of antitrust should be, where this should
go.
But there is something about this discretion, and I would
just like to put in, right before the break, a little plug for politics.
Political values with a little p, not the Chicago (sorry, Chicago)
and not the Illinois-governor type of politics, but political values.
In a way I have nothing against the Bush administration. They
came in. They had political values. I don't like their values, but it
seems to me that antitrust is not just a technical exercise.
And that has to come in, whether we call them rules or standards.
It must come into how we are going to decide these cases; politics
has to be a part of it. Antitrust is not just something we give over
to technocrats.
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